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Abstract: In previous work, I have looked in detail at the capacity and the limits of the 
linguistics model as applied to gene expression. The recent use of a primitive applied linguistic 
model in Apple’s SIRI system allows further analysis. In particular, the failings of this system 
resemble those of the HGP; the model used also helps point out the shortcomings of the 
concept of the “gene”. This is particularly urgent as we are entering an era of applied biology 
in the absence of theory, and indeed an era with a near-epidemic of retracted papers. 
There are a few workarounds proposed. One is to add to the nascent field of biosemiotics a 
more explicit concern with syntax. At the time of writing, Apple is being sued for false 
advertising of its iphone 4s, with the associated claim that apple had solved many of the 
problems of natural language processing by computer (nlpbc). The system was bought by Apple 
from a company called SIRI, and in turn was based on the notion, trumpeted by the prior art 
in a company called Dejima, that nlpbc could be done by keywords alone.  
Yet the hype resembles nothing so much as the misrepresentation of the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) fed to the media in the glory days at the beginning of this millennium, and it 
says a lot for the status of scientists in society that they have avoided Apple's fate. In this paper, 
a short review of several current themes in theoretical and applied biology is first proposed. 
Then the tensions implicit in the notion that the “gene” is simultaneously to be identified as a 
unit of inheritance and spatially located over spatially well-defined nucleotides is explored and 
the notion is found to be incoherent. An expanded notion of inheritance is proposed in the 
context of a focus on inheritance as necessarily involving species, population and organism over 
time. 
While it is premature to talk about a paradigm shift, it is certainly arguable that biology 
urgently needs a sophisticated theory of how symbols work substantially more sophisticated 
than that implicit in the HGP; Biosemiotics affords a framework in which this might be tried. 
Indeed, as this paper concludes, there may yet be room for a “Bionoetics”, a perspective in 
which biological explanation can be extended to include cognition in all its forms. Finally, a 
working sketch of a modeling environment written in LISP, one that shows promise in 
reflecting the complexities discussed in the paper, is included. 
Keywords: Biosemiotics; keyword analysis; syntax; genome; SIRI; GUT; reductionism 
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1. A SHORT LISP TUTORIAL 
Like the computer language LISP, DNA is homoiconic. Thus, a single string can be 
either program or data, depending on the context. Lisp uses the quote mechanism to 
achieve this. In particular, LISP normally uses the following syntax; 
 
(function parameters)  
 
This is called a form. LISP has been nicknames “lots of irritating silly parentheses” and 
it is fair to say that the syntax, involving embedded parentheses to arbitrary recursive 
depts., is initially off-putting. I ask the reader to be patient, because I believe the pay-
off to be worth it. 
 
Very simply, (+ 5 3) will result in 8 being returned by the interpreter symbolized by 
“>” 
 
So this is a dialogue; 
 
> (+ 5 3)  
8 
 
We may wish, for whatever reason, to have (+ 5 3) regarded simply as a list. In that 
case, we put a “front”  
quote in front of it ‘(+ 5 3).. Now look what happens; 
> ‘(+ 5 3) 
 
(+ 5 3) 
 
So now we have non-coding, “silent’ DNA. Alternative splicing in genetics is similar to 
an alternative prepositional phrase attachment that has been rejected. It is only a 
minor stretch to think of a “front” quote as modeling this. Short et al (2008) indicate 
how this could be used by evolution to try different possibilities.  
 
However, LISP is infinitely more subtle than this. It may be the case that we want part 
of a list evaluated, and the other part left as it is. For this we can use `, or backquote. 
The use of comma (,) in conjunction with backquote stipulates that everything in the 
form immediately following the comma is to be evaluated, and the rest is to be left as it 
is.  
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Thus, we can construct a list like (print `(the answer is , (+ 5 3)) and when we get this 
evaluated we see; 
> (print `(the answer is , (+ 5 3)) 
 
(the answer is (8)) 
 
We can get rid of the parenthesis with @ 
> (print `(the answer is , @(+ 5 3)) 
 
(the answer is 8) 
 
Now we have the capacity to model how various parts of a string of nucleotides might 
be interpreted as program or as data. There is one farther step to take; the issue of how 
the same string can be now program, now data, and this can be taken on faith unless 
the reader wants to consult the addendum at the end of this paper.  
2  BIOLOGICAL COGNITION, COGNITIVE BIOLOGY 
The argument of this paper in a nutshell is the following; the pressure to consider 
Biology to be largely a computational science in some non-trivial way will intensify in 
the years immediately ahead. Coupled with this will come an accompanying impetus 
to reify biological process with statistical analysis as its fundamental touchstone. This 
has already been attempted in computational analysis of natural language and has 
largely failed with syntax and semantics now seen as also necessary. What biology may 
indeed need is an articulated account of how its symbols function, and a modeling 
environment in which to express this. The following paper makes a gesture in this 
direction, with code in the appendix, and then considers larger issues of how to 
consider cognition as part of nature; eventually to turn the tables and ask in what sense 
cognition - and perhaps computation - is a biological phenomenon. 
About a generation ago, it became clear that a “computational paradox” loomed 
in the cognitive sciences. A similar one obtains in the biology of the early third 
millennium. The cognitive sciences had witnessed a spectacular series of successes in 
AI starting from the 1950’s equaled in magnitude only by the distressing failure of the 
early AI systems to scale, or indeed to function in real-world environments. At this 
point, many of us, including the present author (2003)  and Bickhard (2009) following 
Edelman (Rose, 2003)began to argue for the necessity of biological foundation for a 
putatively unified “cognitive science”.  This of course is consonant with the 
reductionsist drive in science, and led to an eschatological drive in cognitive science 
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called “eliminative materialism”. This drive needs to be commented on before we 
proceed further. .  
As described in Gleick's biography, Richard Feynman used to erupt volcanically 
when asked by a journalist for a sound-bite-sized “theory of everything” (GUT). A 
great deal of physics, as Huxley put it, boils down to ever more precise measurements. 
It is premature closure to imagine that a few sentences, from however venerable a 
source, can elucidate anything significant.  
There is a deeper and related issue; the status of mathematical physics. The 
viewpoint taken here is that mathematics is a very compressed and laconic language, 
arrived at through intense negotiation over millennia between constraints due to our 
symbolic apparatus, the physical world, and what we can communicate to each other. 
Consequently, the sin of “psychologism” - that attempt every generation to reduce 
math to psychological processes – is akin to a labour negotiator pretending that a set of 
agreements no longer holds, that all power is with the employer or with the union, and 
the other side must conform. 
Yet mathematics is the holy grail of all Reductionism- a set of equations that will 
explain everything about what we and the world are. Such a set of equations would be, 
even in principle, subject to constraints due to a set of rules arising from axioms and 
theorems. It would be complex in the extreme. It would not explain subjectivity, which 
has a deus ex machina status in QM, or information, which is implicit in nature. It 
would rest on the creaky philosophical foundations of math.  
None of this is really important, because few if any reductions from one discipline to 
another have been successful in the entire history of science. While chemistry is in 
principle reducible to physics, the complexity of fields like quantum chemistry 
indicates that the end is nowhere in sight. Biology seems to require codes, nowhere 
clear in chemistry. Reductionism, to be successful, requires that one would know 
precisely the phenomena to be explained, the depth of reduction required, and the 
terms in which the Reductionism is to take place.  
Better perhaps to begin to re-introduce the word “explanation”. This is particularly 
the case in that there do seem to be distinctions inherent to nature between the 
“merely” physical, the biological and the conscious – just for starters. What we can 
salvage from the Reductionist enterprise is the notion of constraints on our 
explanations. Precisely because the GUT would require tensors of the fourth order, 
used in GR, so cognitive science is constrained to allow that the brain uses these. In 
fact, the apparatus of recursions, formal grammars, and tensor calculus that we were 
using in the late 1990's before the fmri “results” began pouring in seems now to be 
judicious in the extreme. 
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With our renovated cognitive science comes an appropriate set of technologies, 
from HCI (including BCI) to AI to cognitive therapy. That is the most profound 
benefit from eschewing the eschatological Reductionism of eliminative materialism; we 
can actually do things with the tools described at the level of finite automata, 
algorithms and indeed – to some extent – subjective states.  
Biology is going through a similar phase to that of the halcyon era in AI, with the 
$1k human genome now a reality. Skeptics question whether this computational ethos 
can really capture living systems, with Conrad Waddinton’s pithy remark of 50 years 
ago that DNA bears  the same relation to life as the London phone book bears to the 
social life of London now seeming prescient.   The reply, of course, is that the  
computational ethos works. The argument of this paper is that it will work only up to a 
point, and that symbolic functioning introduces into Biology the necessity for a new set 
of concepts in order to avoid making the same mistakes as AI, exemplified by the SIRI 
system. In particular, molecular biology needs syntax just as much as AI does.  
At the risk of making a new set of mistakes, this paper goes considerably further, if 
tentatively so. For writers like Goodwin (2001), Lewontin and Rose have argued 
passionately for a wholly new paradigm in Biology. The answer, as before, is that 
reductionism works, and that there is no indication that a new paradigm is necessary. 
Yet certain of the “new paradigm” arguments now seem unassailable; living systems  
function far from thermodynamic equilibrium, species and environment co-evolve, 
non-linearity is necessary to describe living systems, and teleological reasoning is 
necessary not just for the mundane purpose of explain what the heart is for, but to 
describe how the multiplicity of possible proteins is constrained. In fact, Biology may 
need an anthropic principle of some sort. 
The most extreme position taken in this paper argues that biology needs symbolic 
and cognitive foundations just as much as “cognitive science” needs biological 
foundations. Alternatively put, an appropriately chosen set of (meta) concepts can 
encompass both Biology and “cognitive science” in the wild (to use Ed Hutchins 
phrase). These concepts, coupled with teleolonomy, the notion that living systems act 
as if they have purpose, result in a perspective called Bionoetics. It is this writer’s hope 
that, having read this paper, the reader will be convinced of the necessity of taking at 
least a few steps in the direction proposed by the paper.  
 
There are various striking themes in current biology that indicate its massive ambition 
; 
  Mapping ever mere complex biochemical pathways, which often include 
sophisticated gene expression networks; 
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Looking at how drugs can be delivered by plotting the mechanical and biochemical 
nature of the targets with the added impetus of the possibility of using 
nanoengineering to safely deliver drugs; 
Understanding stem cells by factoring in the whole area of epigenetics – and physics, 
as shown by use of Hooke’s law; 
(Good Old-fashioned) GOF biology; for example, ever more refined examinations of 
meiosis and mitosis; 
Attempts to look at cancer sub specie viruses, and treat it sometimes qua its physical 
properties, thus perhaps neglecting the critical issue of aneuploidy; 
Much use of biomimicry, particularly in looking at metabolism of cellulose; 
Outliers like the aneuploid theory of cancer 
 
To this ambition is coupled relative agnosia about paradigms, not a bad thing if 
the goal is as pure as explicating a biochemical pathway. Yet this agnosia borders on 
ignorance (O Nuallain 2008 a); the Keynes remark that anti-intellectuals are 
unknowingly in the grip of some conservative economist applies a fortiori to biology, 
which in the absence of theory still has an implicit notion of the gene qua Cartesian 
homunculus/CPU. The HGP blundered into precisely the same set of errors that 
natural language processing by computer (nlpbc) had dome a generation before. Sadly, 
Biology has yet to produce a metatheory/paradigm that will prevent such mistakes 
recurring, as they just have, with a cost this writer  correctly predicted in the tens of 
billions – at least – to Apple’s share price. Yet a few other research and industrial 
trends can also be pointed out that indicate how working biologists brilliantly make up 
theory on the fly, as they also show how the legal framework is in a state of flux; 
Cancer work on double stranded breaks shows appropriate sophistication in 
dealing with the interaction between biochemical processes and gene expression, 
indicating that  - given sufficient urgency in the subject matter - common sense 
prevails (Volcic et al, 2012); 
 Despite this, the lack of a clear formalism to handle non-homologous 
recombination – a formalism that a Biosemiotic approach (see below) to gene 
expression could supply – has made the aneuploidy theory of cancer more refractory 
than it should be (Pellman, 2007); 
The recent Supreme court decisions on the Myriad case makes it urgent that we 
find a formalism to explicate in full what the informational processes involved in life 
actually are in a way that does justice to the diverse roles of DNA, RNA, and all other 
factors;  
Provocative work by Pellionisz – who may turn out to be regrettably ahead of his time 
in genomics as in neuroscience - correctly brings recursion into focus; 
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It is established at this point even in the popular press (like the NY Times of 2 April 
2012) that identical twin studies have indicated that disease markers are relatively 
inscrutable in the DNA; 
The role of viruses in editing DNA may extend even to their effectively creating whole 
new grammars (see O Nualláin, 2008 a for a tutorial on this)  and there are attested 
cases of endogenous viruses causing speciation in eukaryotes; 
Less glaringly, mechanisms like alternative splicing also indicate that our current 
construction of phylogenetic trees is too simple-minded. Sometimes  divergence of 
evolutionary evidence from morphological and molecular sources leads to ambiguity 
about how to classify a species (Cohena et al 2005); 
The number of mechanisms other than those proposed by Crick’s “central dogma”, 
advanced by researchers like Tao Pan is reaching well into the hundreds. Remarkably, 
it is possible that mai-based cures that like about to be attempted for Hepatitis C (with 
very promising clinical trials in San Francisco in late 2011) might have been discovered 
long ago, sans central dogma. The FDA has just given tentative approval to miravirsen 
 
Many years after the epidemic of Kaposi’s Sarcoma, the functioning of SOX is till 
being teased out; an endonuclease in vivo, an exonuclease in vitro, it is selective or not 
in its destruction of mRNA in a manner that has yet to be resolved (Glaunsinger et al, 
2005, now looks naïve). A new formalism is necessary. 
 
It is clear that Biology needs syntax quite as much as natural language processing by 
computer  (nlpbc) and its protagonists need to avoid future SIRI moments in court. 
Some of the discussion that follows is an exercise in Biosemiotics. In its weak form, this 
subject studies nature through the lens of signal and symbol theory; in its strong form, 
it regards Biology as fundamentally a semiotics science. As such, it regards linguistics 
as a biological subject. Yet, with the exception  of Witzany’s work (see my reviews in 
triple-c), Biosemiotics has unfortunately fallen under the spell of Peircean semiology to 
the point of ignoring what biology needs from it; syntax and semantics in action.  
We can go a stage further and, following this author, introduce a new term called 
”Bionoetics’ which looks at Mind manifest in the interaction of organism, population 
and species with their environment over time. Considered as focusing on a single 
human subject, this subject becomes cognitive science; out in the field (literally) it 
subsumes ethology. Biosemiotics and Bionoetics together constitute something 
approaching a new paradigm. They allow a creative fusion of the human and 
biological sciences, while adding a new array of tools and metatheory to biology. 
In Bionoetics, we consider the principle unit of study as function over time. In 
Wittgenstein’s classic dictum, the meaning of a word is its use in real life; the scenario 
we’re proposing suggests that we should ignore details of specific proteins and so on as 
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irrelevant when first characterizing a process. For example, sequence similarity is not 
sufficient to propose functioning mimic epitopes; the pioneering work of Rachel 
Carson and Thea Coburn demonstrated that often there is no apparent surface 
similarity – whatever about at the quantum level – between the artificial and natural 
chemical that is being imitated with tragic consequences.  Mimesis in nature involves 
species often using vastly different genetic and biochemical processes to the species 
that they are imitating in order to achieve an effect that seems similar to its target 
audience (Moffett, 1995).  
THE SADNESS OF SIRI  
The central function envisaged here is a user asking a direction or price question using 
a cell phone. Speaker-independent digit recognition is already available on many cell 
phones. The basic vocabulary needed for direction and prices in a specific area comes 
only to a few hundred words. Many phone apps have been developed to exploit this 
opportunity; the most high-profile and controversial one is Apple’s SIRI.  
Apple may have prematurely launched SIRI because of Steve Job’s imminent 
death; the ad campaign for which it is being sued, which features celebrities like John 
Malkovich, was apparently released very shortly before Jobs’ death, and essentially is a 
rerun of a 1987 Apple video of an ideal for human-computer interaction (hci). Indeed, 
Malkovich asks his SIRI to tell him jokes. Apple’s response to the lawsuit is instructive; 
they claim SIRI is still in Beta state, and that the plaintiffs had 30 days in which they 
could return their phones for attested malfunction. In other words, Apple does NOT 
claim that SIRI works as advertised. The remainder of this section explains why and 
proposes an alternative; a similar argument will be made later for computational 
models of gene expression. In particular, it will be argued that the programming 
language LISP offers several of the facilities needed by SIRI-type systems, and by 
modeling of gene expression. LISP allows programs and data to have the same form; 
this is clearly relevant for gene expression. Indeed, the same text in a program can 
now be a program, now be data. Other advantages are pointed out below. Let’s return 
to the issue of how to do SIRI tasks correctly, and then see where this takes us with the 
HGP.   
 The scenario proposed involves a hard-wired speaker-independent vocabulary 
and context-sensitive uploading of sites particular to the region in which GPS locates 
the user at a particular moment. This uploading can involve redundant definition of 
specific words with the phonetic string passed on to Nuance (aka Dragon dictate, 
which Apple uses for SIRI). 
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Remarkably, speech will actually make the parser more robust. For example, 
interrogatives in English about location default to “where” plus “object”;  
 
Where is the Metropolitan museum?/Where can I find the Metropolitan museum? 
Both default to “where” and “Metropolitan museum”. The same goes for the 
equivalents in French (ou), Spanish (Donde), German (wo), and Italian (dove).  So the 
parser needs to hear only “Where” and  “Metropolitan museum”. 
 
Thus, terms like “where” would be hard-wired whereas “Book of Kells” would be 
uploaded in the Dublin area, and “Metropolitan museum” in the New York area. 
There are several advantages in this domain of using speech instead of typed input. 
First of all are the obvious ones; speed, and ease of use. 
 
The speech interface can simply tag all the other words as noise and exclude them 
from the parse. Indeed, for these questions, a simple keyword system would suffice and 
this SIRI could do. That is not the case for more complex questions like,;“How much 
is it to go from Dublin City Center to the airport by taxi vis a vis public transport?” 
 
For this, we need a much more sophisticated parser – and yet it can be done without 
recourse to a full syntactic parse. We can use the mechanism variously known as the 
“semantic grammar” or “Att”. This allows implementation of a basic structure; 
 
<interrogative word> <noise1> <object 1 ><noise2><object 2>….. 
 
Here “How much  = <interrogative word><noise1> = is it to go from<object 1 > = 
Dublin City Center etc 
 
The vocabulary envisaged here has the following “cost” words ;English;“What price 
/How much for” for example; 
How much for a pint of Guinness? Or “How much is it to go from Dublin City Center 
to the airport?” 
What does <noise1> <object 1 > ><noise2><object 2> cost? 
What does <noise1> <object 1 > ><noise2><object 2> <<noisen> <object n > (etc) 
cost? 
 
In the 1980’s, a set of parsers was produced in LISP (for example, Winston et al 1989) 
that exploited the attributes of LISP mentioned above, plus macros (see my 2008 
paper) to provide an elegant formalism for Q+A systems and syntax in general. Let’s 
now consider the parallels with gene expression yet again. 
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GENES AND LISP 
One central problem has been the attempt to maintain simultaneously 
 
the definition of the gene as the unit of inheritance 
the spatial identification of the gene with a string of nucleotides 
 
This essentially corresponds in nlpbc to attempting to perform all the tasks we humans 
do with language by keywords. That the results of this effort are risible is best attested 
by the lawsuit against apple for its system SIRI that claimed to “understand' speaker's 
intent using this method. 
 
We humans use a variety of techniques apart from keyword; syntax, semantics, 
pragmatics, and indeed leaving information out, the dog that doesn't bark in the night 
(O Nuallain et al 2007). Similarly, gene expression uses a rich palate of regulons, 
operators, promoters, transcriptional factors, and so on at the atomic level of strings of 
nucleotides; at higher logical levels, there are gating mechanisms involving hox genes, 
syntactical ambiguity involved in alternative splicing, and master regulatory genes. 
This is all before we start getting into the role of non-dogma mechanisms like 
retroviruses, and the increasingly active role now seen by the ribosome in selecting 
amino acids, to take two examples wherein Crick's portentous shibboleth fails to ward 
off the dark hordes of nescience.  
 
Indeed, if genes are units of inheritance, it is precisely the absence of any sequence of 
nucleotides that occasionally characterize them. For example, the main distinction 
between the two finch species scandens and fortis is cultural; it is a song learned from 
the father without any genetic correlate. So we now must revisit Waddington and note 
that it is perhaps best to consider inheritance wrt function in the environment as well 
as changes to the phenotype. For example, melanism, like blonde hair in humans, can 
be achieved by a variety of mechanisms; field mice may choose to use mc1r or not. 
Finally, there is increasingly solid evidence of epigenetic inheritance. 
 
Evolutionary theory has been hampered by the fact that the paradigms used have been 
atomistic; in actual practice, as illustrated in my 2008 paper  in Cosmos and History, it 
is open to evolution to leave an entire alternative sequence of codons inert or not, the 
better to see how the “hopeful monsters” emerging will functions. The programming 
language LISP, through the backquote mechanism, allows a facility for modeling this .  
 
Similarly, LISP’s object-oriented system (CLOS) allows inheritance so that the 
multifunctionality of SOX can be easily encompassed. In this paper, we are not going 
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to get quite so far; what we‘re going to outline is a simple example of how  a “semantic 
grammar” can elucidate polypeptide structure.  
 
So let's decouple “gene” and “inheritance”. In fact, let's expand our study of 
inheritance to explicit changes to the phenotype, for which we will seek a causal 
mechanism within the organism, and modulation of how the organism functions in the 
environment, for which we'll seek an explanation in terms of informational interaction 
between organism, population and species in an ecosystem over time. It is unlikely that 
our concept of “gene” qua inheritance will now be useful, as there is quite simply too 
much going on to make the inevitably atomistic approach implied by “gene” qua 
inheritance in any way helpful. We went through all this in nlpbc some time ago; 
rather, we go through it once a decade or so. The goal of this paper is partly to try and 
preempt that happening in biology. 
 
Progress in nlpbc in general has been made when reflective people were allowed take 
the reins and point out that, while a complete solution to the “problem” is never going 
to be available, we can gain a good overall perspective AND develop good 
technologies if we resist the temptation to overstate our case. Then the field regresses 
with fads like the statistics scare of the 1990's, which attempted to do away with syntax 
and semantics altogether, and Apple's recent farcical attempt to sell a new phone by 
prematurely declaring victory. The analogy with the HGP hype surely gives pause? 
At the very least, nlpbc has found out the following; 
 
there are various language tasks, from answering a question to creating a novel, which 
demand separate consideration; 
All these tasks evince different relationships between syntax, semantics, pragmatics, 
and the lexicon/words themselves as the context is alternately restricted and 
expanded; the latter to increase informational range and evade reader's tedium by 
freeing up the range of expression; 
There are a range of useful techniques that have been developed; the creator of SIRI 
apparently did not know that the tasks involved are best addressed by a “transition 
tree” approach which works on the assumption that the context has been restricted 
sufficiently for syntax to do some of the heavy lifting in reducing alternative readings 
normally falling to semantics 
 
Piaget’s work  (see my 2003 book) was fundamentally epistemology; early in his career, 
he decided that  the essence of knowledge could be gleaned from analysis of the 
contingent facts of its development. Yet he tried to maintain an objective view of the 
world; for example, number he saw as an ”operational synthesis” between the 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 194 
operations of seriation and cardination, a synthesis that could come into existence only 
after ”conservation” status was achieved (ages 5-8 approx). Therefore, even a 
demonstrated ability to count at a much earlier age – by lower animals as well as 
humans – was not sufficient to convince Piaget that the full concept of number had 
been achieved before conservation. As a neo-Kantian, he would have been very 
receptive to the notion of mathematics as a language capable of mediating subject and 
object.  
 
Modern theorists like Lakoff have extended this line of argument and called for a 
thoroughgoing subjectivism of number with all the dangers that immediately suggest. 
My guess is that Piaget indeed has some critical insights – despite his sloppy 
experimentation. Mathematics has repeatedly been honed to fit with the external 
world; it is NOT the case that Riemann naively produced a formalism that Einstein 
exploited, as Riemann was a very sophisticated thinker who was fully cognizant that 
his formalisms might have unexpected applicability. The initial English translation of 
Riemann by Clifford  made explicit claims about the applicability of non-Euclidean 
geometries to the physical world. Secondly, mathematics indeed confounds our reason 
at times; my compatriot George  Berkeley made telling points about how we deal with 
infinities in differential calculus, and such antinomies are skated over thousands of 
times a day in math classes worldwide.  
 
It has been a mistake in all parts of linguistics – particularly applied areas like 
computational linguistics – to assume that the distinctions we refer to as “syntactic” 
and “semantic” will be reflected in explicit, external dichotomies. It was pointed out by 
Jerry Hobbs, among others, that at a certain degree of restriction of context, many 
selectional restrictions are appropriated by the syntax from the semantics, leading to 
the (horribly named but effective) applied “semantic grammars” 
 
Now we come to the opposite move; that of restricting the context so severely that 
keywords are deemed sufficient (Wittgenstein's labourer saying ”Slab!”). It may be said 
that this is precisely what early NLP (like ELIZA) attempted, and more recently a huge 
Human Genome Project was sold to funding agencies on the same basis that strings of 
text/DNA would reveal everything. 
 
So what we’re left with  - in my humble opinion – is symbolic systems that are tested 
and evolved over millennia, each with a capacity for recursion (which Piaget failed to 
acknowledge), and an ability to change the relationships of the component parts 
(syntax, semantics etc) as context becomes more restricted. Mathematics in particular 
investigates the space of the rational using this method; it produces quite as many 
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beautiful wrong theories as correct theories. What is left is a mystery about how we 
eventually achieve some kind – any kind – of consensus that our models of abstractions 
like black holes are somehow continuous with the mathematics that we know works in 
the real world for something like harmonic oscillators.  That is a topic for the next 
paper; for the remainder of this one, we are going to expand the ideas - so far just 
sketched – about language and gene expression.  
2. LANGUAGE AND GENE EXPRESSION – DETAILS  
 
It is now almost universally accepted (Dennett, 1995; Kauffmann, 2000) that terms like 
“sign”, “signified”,  and “semantics” are appropriate to genetic expression. Moreover, 
as we’ve seen, a field called “Biosemiotics” with an associated set of journals has come 
into being. However, how far can the analogy between genetic expression and natural 
language production and comprehension actually be pushed? This section  first looks 
at natural language, the best-known symbol system. It considers the various attempts 
that have been made formally to characterise human language. First, we broaden the 
context to consider language as one symbol system among others, including the 
genetic code. We then look at language through the prism of formal language theory 
before detailing some of the ingenious and thorough formalisms within the fields of 
formal and computational linguistics. We consider the layers within natural language 
itself, and that consideration leads to speculation about the role of context. Finally, we 
return to our original starting-point of genetic expression, and give a prognosis as to 
the likely progress of this field, as seen from a linguistic point of view. The 
consequences for biology and medicine are then spelled out. It is obviously vital that 
genetics learns lessons from the mistakes of another field. Just as the goal of eliciting 
meaning from parsing of strings of symbols proved infinitely more difficult in natural 
language than anticipated, so the goal of specifying production of proteins from 
nucleotide sequences is likely to exercise us for  several generations.  
2. Natural language (nl) and other  symbol-systems 
2.1 Layers of language and gene expression  
Natural language (nl) seems to share with other human symbol systems like those that 
have been developed through music and art the following attributes (see O Nualláin, 
Seán  (2003, paper 7));  
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1. A hierarchical organization, whereby sentences and musical phrases both consist 
of top-level entities like sentence that can be broken down into subunits like noun 
phrases to be further analysed into words and so on.  
2. Formal complexity of a certain degree (specifically for nl, that of indexed 
grammars,as we shall see), discussion of which will occupy the next subsection 
3. A recursive structure. I state that (this is an example, because within the 
parentheses is a full sentence).  Doug Hofstadter  (1979) famously applied this 
notion, and that of self-reference, to music and art as exemplified by Bach, 
Goedel,  and Escher. 
4. Processing within micro-domains called contexts. This shall also constitute a full 
subsection of this paper, and undoubtedly  applies to genetic expression 
5. Metaphor. For Noyes in the Highwayman, the moon was a ghostly galleon; for 
Piet Mondrian, a jumble of boxes could be “Broadway boogie-woogie”.  
6. Emotional impact 
7. The possibility of self-reference. This sentence is false. All Cretans are liars, said 
the Cretan. Hofstadter (ibid.) argued that Bach died having finally composed a 
self-referential opus.  
8. Ambiguity. The importance of this paper cannot be under-stated. The word 
“egregious” can mean outstandingly good or bad. Alternative splicing in the 
genome does seem to indicate exploitation of ambiguity by nature at this level. 
9. Systematicity. We should be able to say “Cyrano loves the ‘precieuse’” because, 
regardless of semantics, we have already said that “ The ‘precieuse’ loves Cyrano”.  
10. Duality of structure (in language, the phonological and syntactic levels) initially 
established, it is appropriate to predicate of language acoustic, semantic and 
pragmatic levels. We shall later concern ourselves with precisely how many levels 
to attribute to gene expression. 
11. The notion of a native language, the phonotactic details of which become 
hardwired at the expense of  all subsequent language learning. The distinction 
between “rue” and “roue” is audible; however, many of us enter a phonetic 
minefield in trying to distinguish “Caen” , and other soundalikes and sayalikes in 
French, some of which should not be said in polite company. 
12. Creativity. Famously, we can all produce and understand an infinite number of 
sentences, as what we learn are underlying principles. The repeated statement of 
this idea underpins some of Chomsky’s reputation. 
 
Of the above, 5,6,7, and 9 seem inappropriate for gene expression; the rest are at least 
up for grabs. It is appropriate to unpack 10 right now. It is always best to illustrate 
these phenomena with the aid of antinomial entities, which break the rules we are 
explaining. The German “zwei” breaks phonotactic restrictions in English. I will 
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currently be breaking a syntactic rule that there is no future progressive in English. 
Semantic solecisms can be found aplenty in existential judgements about arms in Iraq 
made by our political elites in the early years of this millennium. Finally, were you to 
ask me whether I would like to stop here, and I said “yes” without understanding that 
you might wish to take a break, that would constitute a pragmatic error on my part.  
 
Let us clarify. Phonotactic rules govern combination of phonemes into allowable 
sound-patterns for each particular language. Syntax deals with allowable combination 
of words. “Semantics” is a much more complex nexus of concepts. One the one hand, 
it is about meaning; yet elicitation of meaning often requires recourse to a further 
level, that of pragmatics. On the other hand, “semantic” formalisms are restatements 
of linguistic propositions, often in terms of formal logic. So “I got rhythm” may admit 
of the semantic correlate “Got rhythm (x)”.  How far does that restatement advance 
one on the way to external “stuff”, to “meaning”, to specific proteins? There’s the rub. 
It be all that’s necessary, or  it may be just one step on the road. In general, if context 
is severely restricted, then restatement in a semantic formalism may be sufficient. In 
actual fact, syntax, or indeed bare individual words, may be sufficient for full meaning 
(specification of proteins) if context is severely restricted. The pretext of some of the 
exaggerated claims that came from the HGP was that context was always so restricted. 
It is not; we have generations of work ahead of us looking at how nucleotide sequences 
differentially produce different proteins depending on the metabolic context.   
 
While the spectacle of Connie Chung explaining on primetime TV in 1989 that the 
genome specified everything we are and could be now looks like a bad joke, it must be 
said that many diehards still have an eschatological hope that full nucleotide 
sequencing will reveal all. For example, Nick Campbell in Nature reviews Genomics in 
February 2004 states that biological development is readable in a deterministic manner 
from gene sequences. Similarly  Goodman et al (2005) imply an  aspiration to hard-
core genetic determinism. So the “one gene-one enzyme” paradigm of Beadle et al 
(1941) lives on. 
 
 
In a sense, genetically transmitted diseases can show that the Word can be misspelled 
when it takes flesh. The inherited disease familial dysautonomia arises from a single-
nucleotide mutation in a gene called IKBKAP (Ast, 2005). This corresponds  to the 
phonotactic and orthographic levels in human speech and text; “Next” and “nest” are 
similarly different. Likewise, at a lexical level, Tay-Sachs is caused by a misspelling of 
nucleotides. At the syntactic level, Bcl-x, which governs cell death, can be alternatively 
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spliced into Bcl-x (S), a promoter of cell-death, and Bcl-x(L), a  suppressor thereof 
(ibid).  
 
A linguistic analogy to this is the AI classic 
 
The robot saw the hill with the telescope. 
 
So did the robot need ocular aids to see the hill, or was it looking bare-sensored at an 
observatory? Does “with the telescope” attach to the robot or to the hill? This is 
structural ambiguity; to be more specific, it is a problem of prepositional phrase 
attachment, which needs access to the semantic or a deeper level to be resolved 
(despite the heroic efforts of current research at UC Berkeley by Dan Klein and David 
Hall to solve this with synta).  The nature of this layer has not yet been established for 
the genome.  
 
Strohman (2000) argues, with respect to the possibility of such a layer,  that there exists 
a mesoscopic layer between the genome and phenotype wherein complex 
organisational states can exist and where there exist networks of regulatory proteins 
capable of organising patterns of gene expression and much other emergent cellular 
behaviour in context-dependent ways. In a later summary, Strohman (2003) refers to 
classic work by Veech et al. (2001) that established that the rate-limiting enzyme 
controlling which genes are on or off is a function of the entire mesoscopic system. In 
particular, different enzymes will be used to do the same tasks in different contexts.  
 
 And yes, semantics in natural language has proven almost that messy. In O Nuallain 
(2003) and passim below, this author contrasts the early Wittgenstein’s HGP-like 
sunniness about the prospect of a neat semantic description for language taken as a 
whole with his later wholesale rejection of that idea, and his insistence that language 
could be processed only within microcontexts that he called “Language games”. So is 
the case also for gene expression. 
 
Let us summarize the elements of the proposed analogy between the genome and 
natural language.  Nucleotides, the four letters, spell words, the twenty amino acids. 
These get linked together into chains of varying lengths, the proteins which can be 
words (let’s allow some recursivity), phrases, or sentences. Occasionally, in natural 
language, we happen on words, phrases, and “collocations” that are (almost) 
unambiguous in meaning. Technical terns like “Trilobite”, “formaldehyde”, 
“fratricide” and proper names like “Thailand” are examples. Collocations include 
“media circus”, “team effort”, “world record”, and so on. These are low-hanging fruit 
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for natural language-processing computer programs. Interestingly, they are almost 
context-independent, in that they have only one widely-used metaphorical meaning 
that is distinct from a little-used literal meaning. In the extension of this analogy, the 
HGP picked up only technical terms, proper nouns, and perhaps those collocations 
which are radically context-independent. So it should come as no surprise that only 
2% of diseases currently admit of a straightforward genetic explanation. 
 
Jacob et al. (1962) focussed over a long period of time on the work of regulatory genes 
in their concept of “operons”. These genes were a key to unlock  the actions of a set of 
other genes, which for example would generate trytophan. Regulatory genes, in turn, 
were switched on and off by proteins. So genes can be turned on and off  to respond to 
the environment.  
 
As summarized in Carroll (2013) p 501, we get a schema that lends itself gratefully to 
LISP;  
 
Structural gene – encodes structure of protein eg an enzyme. 
 
Regulatory gene – governs expression of structural gene 
 
Repressor – turns off enzyme production 
 
Operator – acceptor of repressor 
 
Operon – set of Structural genes governed by common repressor and operator and 
usually involved in a common biochemical process.  
 
Let us now revisit the analogy between genome and langauge , which includes 
“context” qua the environment. Gene expression now includes feedback loops. We 
effectively need a new HGP for every context that organisms encounter.  
 
Strohman (opera cit) expands on these points. The expression of the genome is 
regulated through biochemical mechanisms that sense the bioenergetic state of the cell. 
In particular, the metabolites NAD and NADH and other synoptic signals represent 
instant by instant changes in the bioenergetic status of the cell. Changes of metabolites 
like fatty acids and glucose result in differential gene expression through binding to 
transcription factors. Strohman wishes to stress the consequences for progress in 
biology and medicine. Metabolism can be altered by environmental factors like 
sedentary behavior as by gene mutations like amyloid production. Alterations in 
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metabolism, in non-syntactic phenomena, are the proximate cause of disease, and 
cures can be sought without interfering with the genome, or formal language. 
 
Specifically, he argues that gene expression may be regulated by NAD dependent 
histone deacetylase via epigenetic marking of chromosomal histones as during the life 
extension resulting from caloric restriction. Again, context affects meaning of a 
language string in the linguistics analogy.  (Let us emphasise that the major problem in 
nl processing has always been ambiguity).Secondly, he continues that alteration in 
protein amount or structure, as in dystrophin or amyloid may alter the rate of 
metabolic reactions resulting in an altered phenotype. Finally, posttranslational 
modifications like phosphorylation modify proteins. The rather messy picture that is 
emerging reminds one of NL semantics, and indeed of life itself 
 
Strohman is also attempting an oblique attack at the central dogma of molecular 
biology; the deterministic, linear, uni-directional, and encapsulated path from DNA to 
phenotype. Specifically, he wishes to frame the relationship of genotype and 
phenotype in terms of a complementarity between genetics and dynamics, between the 
language as a formal system and the context, to use the corresponding linguistic terms. 
He unpacks and extends Waddington’s  (1966) notion of the “epigenetic landscape” by 
proposing linkages and feedback loops between the DNA, phenotype, proteins, 
environment, and behaviour. Kaufmann (2000)  remarks that this nexus of gene and 
environment must be kept at a very specific state, the “edge of chaos”, for maximum 
creativity to occur. Therefore, behaviors might be genetically assimilated to give  
Lamarckian effects without violating the central dogma that Waddington desired; 
alternatively, as in the case of the scandens finch on the Galapagos, birdsong might 
become entirely learned down the patrilineal line if emergent properties from the 
nexus of organism and environment decides that this is a more economical way of 
storing it than imposing it on the genome.  
 
Formal Language theory and NL formalisms.  
 
Derek Jarman’s classic short film about Wittgenstein proposes that he was nostalgic for 
the days of “The ice”; clear, lucid theories of language that he later eschewed, perhaps 
coincidentally (or not) after living for some time in this author’s native island of 
Ireland. . This is particularly the case as there are deep and beautiful connections 
between formal language theory, set theory,  and computability. The Chomsky 
hierarchy posits languages of different levels of formal complexity. At the top level, 
level 0, are languages that can be modelled by non recursively-enumerable sets. The 
next level, level 1, features languages that are recursively enumerable. Both of these 
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types of language, and the automata that generate  and recognise them,  are too 
powerful to be appropriate models for human language. Level 2 languages are 
generally also considered too powerful to be adequate models for nl; however, Shieber 
(1984) adduced evidence that Swiss German included constructions that only formal 
systems as powerful as level 2 could handle.  (Partly because Swiss German, even more 
than other languages,  is a set of disparate dialects, this result has never been fully 
accepted in the linguistic community). It cannot be proven that any randomly chosen 
level 2 language can be recognised in finite time; likewise, computational problems at 
this level cannot have posited of them a solution in finite time. These connections are 
reminiscent of the unexpected connections between fractals and chaos; a priori, there 
is no reason to anticipate this type of phenomenon. 
The final explicitly recursive level, level 3, is the consensus location for nl. Even 
Swiss German can be handled by a relatively trivial addition to level 3 called indexed 
grammars. Level 3 is also called the level of “phrase-structure” grammars. It is 
illustrated by sentences such as “The mat, on which the cat sat, which Séamus made, 
is in the hall” where we need agreement between subject and its verb often at a 
considerable lexical distance. We describe such agreement using the mathematical 
expression (a^nb^n); Swiss German apparently needs constructions like (a^nb^nc^n). 
Even a^nb^n constructions cannot be handled with any degree of elegance by level 4 
grammars. 
Of course, we are uncertain as to where the genetic code lies in this schema. 
Phenomena like alternative splicing indicate that there is some degree of ambiguity, 
and thus complexity. Hox genes indicate a degree of hierarchical organization, 
context-sensitivity as defined in the terms of the Chomsky hierarchy (see O Nuallain 
2003) and long-distance dependencies, indicating that perhaps the phenomena Shieber 
remarked on are present also in the genome. In any case, the HGP treated the 
Genome as if it was similar to the parody of language apparent in the pattern-
matching programs of the 1960’s. Lisp programs were programmed in these systems 
with preprogrammed scripts like “I have problems with my x”, to which they would 
reply “Tell me more about x”. It is likely that parsing the genome is infinitely more 
complex than this. 
There has been much superb formal and computational linguistics since the 
1960’s, though the general problem of parsing any arbitrary sentence in any arbitrary 
natural language and extracting meaning therefrom remains inviolate. Thus, 100% 
accurate machine translation will forever remain a pipedream. The original so-called 
Chomskyan “revolution” which at least had the virtue of adding the rigour of 
Chomsky’s teachers  to the area, was attacked with respect to its dichotomisation of 
“syntax” with a “black box” called “semantics”. In particular, the early Chomsky had 
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difficulty with the manifest difference that could be wrought by a quantifier like 
“some” in the two sentences “Formal linguistics is nonsense” and “Some formal 
linguistics is nonsense”. Thereafter, at one  extreme, formalisms like categorial 
grammar shifted the burden to the lexicon; therefore, the lexical item’s (or gene’s) 
possible syntactic and semantic roles were assumed encoded in it.  It is likely that 
genetics will plumb for a formalism like this, even though others like lexical-functional 
grammar are manifestly superior for language. Chomsky’s later X-bar predilection is 
in keeping with the MIT tendency to impose more on the lexicon in the manner of 
categorial grammar. 
Compositional semantics demanded that the syntactic components should each 
generate expression in a semantic formalism like lambda-calculus, which could then be 
summarized through processes like beta-reduction.  The resulting output, 
corresponding to the “meaning”, was initially presumed to require no further parsing 
despite its opaque nature. However, the formal semantic analysis of a sentence like 
“Would you like to keep quiet for a moment?” in whatever semantic formalism does 
not constitute its meaning in any real sense. That requires pragmatics; the 
perlocutionary impetus of the statement in pragmatic terms is a request for silence, not 
an expression of the speaker’s pleasure.  
Yet nl processing (nlp)  made massive strides for some time; indeed, it is fair to say 
that an asymptotoic state was reached in the early 1990’s. Syntactic parsing is a 
textbook affair; the national software registry allows downloading of many useful tools. 
Type 3 grammars are well represented by systems like the Alvey natural language 
toolkit. This system maps a huge subset of English onto lambda calculus, a semantic 
formalism whose origins reveal much about the origins of formal computational 
theory. A process called beta-reduction makes the resulting output more economical. 
What then? Well, for each specific application, as is mentioned below, the words to be 
used must be implemented as separate Lisp objects and taught how to interact with the 
semantic formalism. We are right back to square one; the omni-pervasiveness of 
context. Likewise, even the best natural language generator systems like Charon has 
difficulty in formalizing the interplay of linguistic and conceptual elements. Absurd 
claims dating back to Schank’s  (1975)  work have not helped and perhaps quickened 
the tendency within genetics to use what looked like a happy language metaphor.  It 
behooves us to look at context more closely. 
CONTEXT 
While “culture” has claims to  be the most confusing world in the English language, 
even its meaning will depend on context. “Context” is much talked about, and very 
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little understood. Even the most naïve PR person knows to complain that his egregious 
statements are being taken “out of context”. We have gotten little distance with this 
term in decades of nl by computer, despite everyone understanding what it is in folk 
psychological terms. What then is the prognosis for gene expression in context? 
Perhaps context can best be introduced by considering the project of the early 
Wittgenstein (1922), hinted at above. Wittgenstein sought a grand unified theory 
(GUT) of language. He argued that what was out there in the world was 
“Sachverhalten” states of affairs. The world, he argues, “is all that is the case”. The 
Sacverhalten could be decomposed into Tatsachen, simple elements. Language, he 
argued, consisted of propositions that could be decomposed into atomic propositions. 
Atomic propositions could be mapped on to simple elements by what he called a 
“private language”, idiosyncratic to everyone (Think of it as the instruction set of a 
computer). Wittgenstein later repudiated this “Tractatus” idea of language in favour of 
one that gave a pre-eminent role to context. Language, he argued, should be 
considered in context; language-games like guessing riddles, playing chess, and telling 
jokes should be the focus of study. Otherwise, he argued, one ended up asking 
ridiculous questions in language like “What is a language”? To spell it out, one is 
already immersed in a language-game as one formulates the question, and one cannot 
bootstrap oneself up to an objective perspective. 
Wittgenstein (1967) presses the attack at this point. Language is like a city, he 
opined, with warrens in old sections contrasting with the rationally laid-out modern 
thoroughfares that are analogous to scientific discourse in language; we have seen his 
compatriot Witzany compare these  to introns and exons, respectively. The process of 
interpretation of the language is going to be vastly different as one goes from one 
section to the other. Relatively clean types of interpretation that even the HGP could 
support will work for the modern section, but not for the warrens. Of course, 
Wittgenstein should not be our main source here. There is plenty of other evidence for 
the hypothesis that language does not admit of a single method of analysis and, by 
extension, that we need to be very careful about positing a monolithic type of gene 
expression. 
Even allowing for the Stalinist bias he was forced to impose on his writings, 
Vygotsky (1962)  can responsibly be interpreted as arguing for different evolutionary 
roots for thought and language. Thought can be discerned in animals’ problem-
solving; language originates in signalling-systems like birdsong.  Piaget’s (1972) 
monumental research oeuvre gave pride of place to “operational knowledge”; 
conceptual and motor knowledge whose origin is an internalisation of our interaction 
with the world. For Piaget, language is a form of operational knowledge; Vygotsky, 
probably more correctly, would emphasise more the autonomy of the linguistic 
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apparatus. (Indeed, the loss of reputation that Piaget has suffered perhaps can be 
ascribed to his stubbornness on this point, which made him vulnerable to the 
Chomskyans as Cognitive Science developed. His most prominent intellectual heir is 
ironically the renegade Chomskyan George Lakoff, who does not acknowledge 
Piaget’s influence).  
Again, the musings of two deceased psychologists may be of less than urgent 
interest to readers of this book. Yet their speculations gain impetus from a survey of 
the successes and failures of nlp, and particularly machine translation (MT). Talented 
researchers like Nirenburg (Nirenburg et al, 1991) and Roger Schank’s students 
(Schank, 1975) implicitly followed the path of the early Wittgenstein, as they sough the 
Holy Grail of MT; fully automatic translation between human languages by mapping 
onto a set of language-neutral logical atoms and then mapping from these atoms onto 
target text. So, for example, we go from “Is fear mé” in Gaelic through a formalism 
like Schank’s conceptual dependency, which claimed that all meanings could be 
expressed in a set numbering in the low teens (it varied) of logical atoms and we output 
a Gallic Muddy Waters “Je suis un homme” in French.  
Both Nirenburg and the Schankian school later saw the error of their ways, and 
began to produce effective systems that worked within specific contexts. In particular, 
Schank borrowed a concept from Piaget via Frederic Bartlett of the “script”, a 
stereotyped set of actions. So there is a script for entering a restaurant, for diplomatic 
visits, for earthquakes, and so on. Again, the parallel with Wittgenstein’s “language-
games” is striking. The later Schankian systems (Schank et al, 1975) were surprisingly 
effective within micro-contexts; yet, as we have described above for the Alvey systems, 
the Schankian logical primitives have to be mapped to specific words in the micro-
context (for example, “open”, “ask”, and “sit” in the restaurant example)  for 
processing to occur. Nirenburg’s altogether more detailed work began to distinguish 
between generally available semantic distinctions (we always consider whether entities 
are living or not) to context-dependent ones (is that a cheesy teenage song, or not?). 
Our own work (Ó Nualláin et al., 1994) confirmed this as we used the Alvey tools to 
construct visual scenes on a screen on the basis of nl input. 
Let us recap. All processing of language, and indeed all cognition, is contextual 
(Ceci et al, 1994). (Indeed, this author would argue (2008 b) that the cognitive role of 
self is to prevent information overload by keeping contexts separate; the alternative is 
mental illness. We narrate to ourselves continually to prevent this). The relationship 
between syntax and semantics was at least addressed in nl processing by computer 
(nlp) (Lesmo et al, 1985) and needs to be in genetics. Contexts, at first blush, seem to be 
idiosyncratic interactions between linguistic and operational knowledge, which require 
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knowing the precise relationship between the words (the genes) and semantic 
formalism (the metabolic context)  in order for correct processing to occur (in order to 
predict what proteins will be generated).  It is likely indeed that all of this holds for 
genetics; access to entities like perlocution seems to demand knowledge of oneself as 
the object of another’s wishes, and therefore consciousness, and is not relevant to 
genetics.    
Cognition is also massively hypothesis-driven, and it is likely that every act of gene-
expression draws in some way on the experience of the whole organism. We can 
distinguish in language between acts of context-determination, which don’t involve 
any but generally available semantic primitives like +-alive, and processing within 
contexts where there is interaction between context-specific primitives and words. It is 
not unreasonable to expect such phenomena in genetic expression. Yet there is a 
deeper consideration still in language and context  with which we will close this 
section. 
Any language processing act involves evidence from orthographic/phonotactic, 
lexical, syntactic, semantic/operational, and pragmatic sources of knowledge. The 
classic “pipeline” model sees information travelling strictly from left to right in this 
schema. So we assemble sounds into words, parse the words syntactically, add some 
semantic interpretation, and finally take into account where we are in the discourse, 
what the interlocutor is expecting of us, and arrive at an interpretation and/or course 
of action. However, as argued in Jackendoff (1987) and elsewhere, interactions can be a 
great deal more complicated. The letters “I L Y” in a certain context, that of a 
marriage proposal a la the famous scene in Anna Karenina, can result in a rigorous 
business contract with punitive buy-out clauses. For Wittgenstein (1967), a labourer 
saying “slab” was being quite linguistically sufficient in the circumstances of a 
construction project; he wants a slab, rather than to discourse on the geology of the 
material. So we can have connections from the orthographic or lexical straight to the 
pragmatic if context is sufficiently restricted.  
Specifically, context seems to deform the layers of language as it becomes 
restricted in much the same way that gravity deforms space-time as one approaches 
the surface of a planet. At a  level intermediate between reading the New York Times  
and I L Y, semantic relations are appropriated by the syntax in “semantic grammars” 
used for natural language interface to public services. The HGP worked on the 
assumption that the context was always going to be sufficiently restricted  for single 
words to work, and therein lies its failure. It is a valuable lexicographic tool, and 
therein lies its success. However, we also need syntax, semantics, discourse pragmatics, 
and enumeration of contexts if nl is anything to go by.  
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Barbieri’s work (1998, 2002) is a fundamental analysis of biosemiotics and related 
fields like biosemantics. He makes the point from a semiotics point of view that the 
distinction between context-independent and context-dependent semantic primitives 
needs to be emphasised in genetics. It may indeed be the case that the HGP, 
considered thus, has revealed only the low-hanging fruit; context-dependent 
primitives. Alternatively, it may be useful to consider the HGP’s findings as 
collocations, or indeed as purely a lexicon; in any case, low-level fruit with context 
rigorously circumscribed. 
So is NL anything to go by? The answer is “at least partly”. In NL understanding, 
we are often concerned with getting the gist of a full story, and that is when the full 
artillery of linguistic techniques is used. In Gene expression, we are initially concerned 
with building a full organism, so the analogy is appropriate here. Natural language is 
also used to elicit a simple answer to a simple question, or specify a protein in genetic 
terms; such elicitation may be available to the technique known as “semantic 
grammars” in language, no correlate of which has yet been found in genetics. Can it 
be the case that  combinations of metabolic context and nucleotide sequence recur in 
ways which are useful to predict the generation of proteins? A first step is obviously to 
do a human genome syntax project in the way that Ast (2004, 2005) has hinted at in his 
analysis of alternative splicing. Only then can we see if fatty acids are been taken up by 
transcription factors in systematic ways that echo the appropriation of semantic roles 
by syntax in “semantic grammars”  (Ó Nualláin, 2003, Pp. 121-126). 
Sometimes we understand language in order explicitly to act; we map the language 
onto a set of Piagetian “schemes” (Schankian “scripts”), routinised sequences of 
behaviour.  Similarly, we read in order to evoke a script that we may or may not act 
on. Such leisure is not available to the genome; undoubtedly, however, the task of 
organism construction is a s complex as anything in language (and of course itself 
generates the elements of the linguistic apparatus).  
The prognosis for genetics from analysis of the history of nlp must be, then, that it 
must start research into the syntax of the genome at a level much deeper than mere 
introns and exons. While there has been preliminary work on this, it is urgent that we 
decide issues such as what level of the Chomsky hierarchy the genome lies on. Are 
there Swiss German type constructions for certain creatures? Could it be the case that 
the difference between human and chimpanzee brains, to take one celebrated 
example, is that between Chomsky types? The consensus from Salzberg et al. (1998) is 
that, whereas the genome is susceptible to description by finite-state automata, 
protein-folding requires dependencies at long distances, and thus the artillery of 
context-free grammars. Abe et al. (1997) comment on protein prediction. 
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It must then try and understand the “semantics”, the metabolic context  for the 
particular case that Veech et al (2001) examine. Then comes issues of “discourse 
structure”; how tasks like building and maintaining the integrity of the organism act as 
high-level goals affecting the minutiae of protein generation. Finally come issues 
relating to how these elements come together in specific contexts. There are 
generations of work ahead, all of which will bear fruit for biology and medicine.  
Specifically, the template-matching “one gene, one protein/enzyme” story is 
childish. When we arrive at a more sophisticated understanding, it will have huge 
consequences for biology and medicine. Gene expression involves interactions of 
genome, environment, and emergent characteristics of networks of proteins as 
Strohman (opera cit.) has rightly argued. In this framework, we can begin to 
understand how exercise and diet affect metabolism, how metabolism affects gene 
expression, and how health is maintained as the dynamic set of relations it is.  
3. CONCLUSION 
This paper is a preliminary foray into theory and metatheory in biology. It begins with 
the similarity between Apple’s flawed SIRI system and the similarly flawed HGP. This 
leads to a discussion of what a more veridical theory of symbolic functioning in nature 
would look like, and an exhortation that the modeling be done in LISP. Finally, by 
way of opening a discussion, an overall perspective called “Bionoetics” is motivated 
from the paradox that, in our current state of knowledge, both life and mind may 
simultaneously seem totally accidental and totally inevitable and this will be detailed in 
the next paper.  
 
APPENDIX 
In previous work (2008 a) this author alluded to the use of macros in Lisp to model the 
action of Hox genes. Here, we can elaborate further and claim – pace Atlan and his 
colleagues – that there is a case for using macros as a formalism that allows the same 
string of nucleotides both be program and data.  
 
There is a sketch, as yet unimplemented,  of what the code would look like in common 
Lisp in appendix A; Please see Winston and Horn (1989)for auxiliary code  
 
Appendix 
At the top level we have 
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(defmacro define-tree (name-of-tree tree-description) 
  `(defun ,name-of-tree (word-list) 
     (interpret-tree ',tree-description word-list))) 
 
This macro is used here 
 
 
(define-tree interface 
  (brnchs 
    (count > objects if-end-rtn 
                     (db-call `(db-count ,objects))) 
    (> enumerate > objects if-end-rtn 
                           (db-call `(db-show ,objects))))) 
 
and this generates `(defun interface 
 
which is a function like this  
 
(defun interface (word-list) 
  (interpret-tree  
    '(brnchs 
       (count > objects if-end-rtn  
         (db-call `(db-count ,objects))) 
       (> enumerate > objects if-end-rtn 
         (db-call `(db-show ,objects)))) 
    word-list)) 
 
which is, far as I can see, what the macro is meant to generate 
This code  
 
(defmacro define-tree (name-of-tree tree-description) 
  `(defun ,name-of-tree (word-list) 
 
     (interpret-tree ',tree-description word-list))) 
 
allows a function (for example find-oxytocin) to be created that will also use the data 
structure corresponding to oxytocin to be part of the function itself once it is 
interpreted as data. The following is a sketch of what the rest of the code looks like – 
 SEÁN O NUALLÁN 209 
please note > is an instruction to parse a sub-tree and return a parameter 
corresponding to a successful traversal of that subtree  
 
Polypeptides 
(define-tree phe  
(interpret-tree  
`(brnchs (uuu) 
(uuc)) 
nucleotides] 
 
(define-tree oxytocin 
(interpret-tree  
(brnchs (> gly >leu > pru > cycs > asn > gln > lle > tyr > cyn 
(if-end-rtn (print 'oxytocin)] 
 
We alternatively can have a separate tree for all polypeptides including oxytocin* 
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